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Chapter 8
Formalism, grammatical rules, and
normativity
Geoffrey K. Pullum
University of Edinburgh
Formalism within logic and mathematics has indirect connections to modern for-
mal linguistics in that the earliest attempt at realizing the formalist program for
logic had the side effect of leading to the development of what today we call gener-
ative grammars. Syntactic theory has been dominated by the generative conception
for six decades. Despite reference in the literature to “rules”, generative grammars
do not contain rules in the usual sense (under which a rule can be followed or
disobeyed). It is not clear how work on generative grammars could make sense
of the idea of normative principles of grammar. But the subject matter of gram-
mar is indeed best taken to be normative: a grammar expresses statements about
what is correct or incorrect, not claims directly about phenomena in the empiri-
cal world. Grammatical rules with normative force can nonetheless be rendered
mathematically precise through a type of formalization that does not involve gen-
erative grammars, and normativity can be understood in a way that does not imply
anything about obligations or duties. Thus there is some hope of reconciling the
normativity of grammar with the enterprise of formalizing grammars for human
languages and the view that linguistics is an empirical science.
1 Introduction
The school of thought known as “formalism” in logic and mathematics takes
these disciplines to be concerned solely with procedures for manipulating strings
over a finite inventory of meaningless symbols. Put like that, it sounds pointless:
logic and mathematics were surely supposed to be about something, not just
meaningless games. But formalism has a point: its aim is to ensure that proofs
of theoremhood are constructed in a way that is scoured clean of any question-
begging hint of meaning or truth. Then, if what is provable turns out to coincide
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with what is semantically tautologous, it can be shown that proof in the syntactic
sense truly accomplishes something.
That is, ideally we want everything logically provable from true premises to
turn out to be true given those premises, and everything that is logically true to
be provable. To show that this has been achieved, without circularity, we need
first a method of proof that pays no regard to meaning or truth, and second a
way of demonstrating that it proves all and only the logical truths. In technical
terms, we want a consistent and complete method of proof.
A crucial contribution to the formalist program in logic, just over a century
old, was presented in an important book by Clarence Irving Lewis (1883–1964):
A Survey of Symbolic Logic.1 Lewis clearly saw that the crucially important work
on reducing mathematics to logic, Principia Mathematica (1910–1913, henceforth
pm) by Alfred North Whitehead (1861–1947) and Bertrand Russell (1872–1970),
had failed to separate syntax from semantics in the logical system it assumed.
The distinction between axioms and inference rules had not yet emerged: White-
head and Russell subsumed them both under “primitive propositions”. In conse-
quence Modus Ponens was framed in a way that, from the formalist viewpoint, is
shockingly confused, because it is semantically contaminated. It says: “Anything
implied by a true elementary proposition is true” and, where 𝑥 is a real variable,
“When 𝜑𝑥 can be asserted […] and 𝜑𝑥 ⊃ 𝜓𝑥 can be asserted […] then 𝜓𝑥 can be
asserted”.
This precludes making legitimate use of the claim that 𝑝 implies 𝑞, unless we
take 𝑝 to be true. But 𝑝 might of course be a proposition we are by no means
sure of. Using logic to see what follows from a false assumption is an important
technique of discovery that Whitehead and Russell’s statement of Modus Po-
nens appears to disallow. Lewis understood that, if we want to be sure that our
symbolic reasoning is trustworthy, we must have a purely syntactical method
of deriving strings, one that does not in any way depend on meaning, and we
must then show that the strings it derives are the right ones – the ones that are
true if and only if the initially adopted premises are true. Lewis sketched in ordi-
nary English a statement of Modus Ponens that ruthlessly excluded any talk of
meaning or truth, referring solely to positions of symbols in strings.
The program for making logic truly formal that Lewis urged was taken up in
earnest by a PhD student in the Department of Mathematics at Columbia Uni-
1See section iii of Chapter 6 in the first edition, 1918; the edition is crucial, because when the
second edition by Dover was authorized, Lewis stipulated that Chapters 5 and 6 of his book
were to be omitted; he felt that whatever value the book had did not depend on those two
somewhat more speculative and heterodox chapters.
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versity. Emil Leon Post (1897–1954) graduated with a mathematics BA from the
City College of New York in 1917, and went on to do a PhD at Columbia under
the philosopher andmathematician Cassius JacksonKeyser (1862–1947).2 Lewis’s
book appeared during Post’s first year as a graduate student, and appears to have
influenced him considerably. The plan for a doctoral dissertation that he con-
ceived involved turning Lewis’s informally presented “heterodox” approach into
a program within pure mathematics. Post aimed to construct:
(I) a way of testing a formula of the propositional calculus used in pm to de-
termine (via truth tables for connectives) whether it was a tautology (i.e.,
a logical truth);
(II) a system for deriving new formulæ (intuitively, the theorems) from given
formulæ (pm’s axioms) that was totally independent of semantic or logical
categories like “constant” or “variable” or “connective”, working on strings
of symbols without reference to their potential meaning; and
(III) a proof that the set of tautologies as determined by (I) coincided with the
set of derivable strings defined by (II).
For the limited portion of Whitehead and Russell’s logic that he tackled, the
propositional part, Post actually achieved that goal (see the abridged version of
his PhD dissertation published as Post 1921). He planned to go on and complete
the job of dealing with the whole of pm’s logic, including its quantificational
reasoning, in a postdoctoral year at Princeton, where he had obtained a Procter
fellowship. In pursuit of that goal, he generalized his syntactical proof system
further, and created a type of formal system that would revolutionize theoretical
linguistics nearly 40 years later.
The system Post worked out in 1921 was not described in a publication until
1943, but there were reasons for that. The reasons had to do with a long battle
against severe manic-depressive mental illness (now usually called bipolar disor-
der). Suffice it to say that the system was general enough that it could express
any imaginable set of rules for deriving strings from other strings. Indeed, Post
rapidly came to regard it as fully capturing the intuitive notion “set for which
it is possible to envisage a way of systematically enumerating the membership”.
Today such a set is usually referred to as recursively enumerable (r.e.).
2Post’s intellectual and personal biography is well documented in broad outline. Sources that
I have consulted include Davis (1994a), Stillwell (2004), De Mol (2006), Urquhart (2009), and
Jackson (2018).
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Formalizing the inference rule Modus Ponens is a very simple application of
Post’s system. Assume a symbol inventory containing “⊃”, “)”, “(”, and letters
like 𝑝 and 𝑞, and 𝑃𝑖 are to be interpreted as indexed variables over unbounded
strings. Assume that we have already been given some strings that do not need
to be proved (intuitively, those correspond to axioms), and we are trying to build
a list of other strings using them (those are the theorems). Then Modus Ponens
says that if we can find a string on our list that has a “(” followed by some other
stuff which we will call 𝑃1, followed by the symbol “⊃”, followed by some further
stuff which we will call 𝑃2, followed by a “)”, and the stuff that we called 𝑃1, on
its own, is also on the list, then the stuff that we called 𝑃2 can be added to the
list.
The way Post put it was that a string of the form “( 𝑃1 ⊃ 𝑃2 )” together with a
string of the form “𝑃1” produce a string of the form “𝑃2”.
Modus Ponens is an extremely simple application of the idea of building strings
systematically on the basis of already obtained strings (though it was crucial for
Post’s PhD dissertation project). But in 1920–1921 as a Procter fellow at Princeton,
Post started working on doing the rest of Whitehead and Russell’s logic – the
reasoning that involved quantifiers – and in connection with that he worked out
a radical generalization of the notion of a rule of inference. There could be any
finite number of “premise” lines, and both the premises and the conclusion could
be of any finite length and contain any number of specified symbol strings and/or
the variables over strings (𝑃1, 𝑃2, etc.). He presented his generalized metaschema
in a truly bewildering tableau. I give it here in a slightly modified form due to
Davis (1982), which (believe it or not) makes things slightly clearer:
𝑔1,0 𝑃1,1 𝑔1,1 𝑃1,2 ... 𝑃1,𝑛1 𝑔1,𝑛1𝑔2,0 𝑃2,1 𝑔2,1 𝑃2,2 ... 𝑃2,𝑛2 𝑔2,𝑛2⋮ ... ⋮
𝑔𝑘,0 𝑃𝑘,1 𝑔𝑘,1 𝑃𝑘,2 ... 𝑃𝑘,𝑛𝑘 𝑔𝑘,𝑛𝑘
⇓
ℎ1 𝑃𝑟1,𝑠1 ℎ2 𝑃𝑟2,𝑠2 ... ℎ𝑗 𝑃𝑟𝑗 ,𝑠𝑗 ℎ𝑗+1
Each of the 𝑔𝑖 and ℎ𝑖 stand for specific strings of symbols that would be given
in the production. The down arrow “⇓” means “produce” in Post’s sense. The
𝑟𝑖 variables tell us which premise line a variable comes from, and the 𝑠𝑖 tell us
which variable we are talking about (counting from the left), so requiring the 𝑟𝑖
to be between 1 and 𝑘 (where 𝑘 is the total number of premises) and requiring
the 𝑠𝑖 to be between 0 and 𝑛𝑟𝑖 (where 𝑛𝑟𝑖 is the total number of variables in the
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relevant line) guarantees that the last line will call only 𝑃𝑖 variables that are
present somewhere in the earlier lines. Thus everything in the conclusion must
be either an explicitly specified string or something drawn from the material
covered by the 𝑃 variables of the premises. Hence the conclusion can say things
like “put the content of the 𝑥 th variable in premise number 𝑦 into the conclusion
at this point”, while not allowing it to say “put in some random stuff at this point”,
which would make nonsense of the idea of representing logical reasoning.
I exhibit the above tableaumerely tomake the point that it represents a schema
fully general enough to express arbitrary string edits. It is more than general
enough to state anything from simple phrase structure rules (immediate con-
stituent analysis), or categorial grammar rules, or Chomsky’s most elaborate gen-
eralized transformations.
Thus a chapter of the history of formalism in mathematical logic turns out
to relate to a crucial part of the prehistory of generative linguistics. For Post’s
specific design of a formalist proof system with axioms as inputs was to emerge
later in Noam Chomsky’s work under a new name: generative grammar.
Chomsky hit upon the idea of rewriting systems as a mathematical technique
for giving syntactic descriptions of human languages some thirty years after Post
developed his production systems. Late in 1951, in the revised version of his MA
thesis,3 Chomsky (1951: 3) used the verb “generate” for the relation between a
grammar and a string of symbols – for the first time in linguistics, as far as I
have been able to determine. By 1954 both Zellig Harris (1909–1992) and Charles
Hockett (1916–2000) had used “generate” in the same way (see Harris 1954: 260
and Hockett 1954: 390). It is not clear whether they were influenced by Chom-
sky’s usage, for although Chomsky had close contacts with Harris up to summer
1951, his December 1951 revision of the MA thesis was done during his first six
months at the Society of Junior Fellows at Harvard (see Chomsky 1975: 26), and
was little known before its publication by Garland in 1979 (Chomsky 1975: 30 says
it met with an “almost total lack of interest”). By 1955 Chomsky had completed a
first draft of The Logical Structure of Linguistic Theory, which proposed a theory
of “generative grammars” in detail (though it was very little read at that time,
and did not appear in print until twenty years later, as Chomsky 1975).
There is no citation or mention of Emil Post in Chomsky (1955–1956), but
from 1959 onward Chomsky has occasionally mentioned Post’s name as an ear-
lier source for the prior use of “generate” in the mathematical literature. Chom-
sky (1959: 137n) notes that he is “following a familiar technical use of the term
3On the two versions of Chomsky’s MA thesisTheMorphophonemics of Modern Hebrew, see the
very careful comparative study by Daniels (2010).
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‘generate’ ”, citing Post (1944), a paper that says almost nothing about how pro-
duction systems work. The locus classicus on production systems is Post (1943),
a paper which Chomsky has never cited, probably because (as conjectured by
Urquhart 2009: 471), he learned about Post’s work mainly or entirely from sec-
ondary sources like the 1950 mathematical logic text by Paul C. Rosenbloom
(1920–2005), which is cited in Chomsky (1975). In Chomsky’s hands over the fol-
lowing six decades, production systems, under the new name “generative gram-
mars”, became the overwhelmingly dominant type of framework for the study
of syntax.
2 Rules
With generative grammars firmly established as mainstream in linguistics, both
linguists and philosophers commonly speak as if generative grammars of the
sort that Chomsky advocates contain something like rules of grammar of the
traditional kind – “The verb agrees with the subject” and so on. Chomsky even
had an early paper called “On the notion ‘rule of grammar’ ”, which might tempt
anyone to think that he was dealing with rules in some antecedently understood
sense. I am not aware of anyone who has pointed out that it is simply not true.
Linguists have completely overlooked a key fact about generative grammars: that
they do not consist of rules in any sense that would be recognized by traditional
grammarians or non-linguists like philosophers.
The ordinary intuitive understanding of a rule is something that we can follow
(that is, behave in a way that complies with it) or break (that is, violate or dis-
obey it). It defines a regular pattern or practice, a way of “going on in the same
way”. But nothing of the content of a generative grammar has anything like this
character. Chomsky actually recognizes this when he comes to respond to the
discussion of rule-following in Kripke (1982) and observes that “we would not
say, as scientists, that a person follows the rule of phrase structure” formulated
as “vp → v np Clause” (Chomsky 1986: 243). A rule of this sort (a context-free
phrase structure rule, to be technical about it) is often thought of as saying “a
verb phrase may consist of a verb followed by a noun phrase followed by a com-
plement clause”, but in fact it means nothing of the kind. The presence of such a
“rule” in a generative grammar neither says nor implies that a vp always contains
a v followed by a np and a Clause in that order. It does not even say that this
is possible. It does not entail that a vp always contains a v, or even that it may
contain a v. These things may be true in a grammar with such a “rule”, or they
may not. Everything depends on what the rest of the grammar says.
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There could be a transformational “rule” that always shifts v to the end of vp
(as with the “universal base” analyses of the early 1970s that derived even sov
languages from vso underlying structures), or the v could be shifted out of the
vp altogether (as in much more recent transformational analyses). In either case
there would never be a vp containing a v with an np following it. Nothing is fixed
by any individual statement in the grammar. Only the entire grammar, taken
holistically, does anything at all; and what it does is to provide an instantaneous
description of the entire set of well-formed sentences. No part of the grammar
expresses any generalization about the shape of expressions in the language.
Through all of the last 60 years of linguistics, and especially the discussion of
linguistics among philosophers, there has been talk of Chomsky-style generative
grammars containing “rules” that is completely counter to the way generative
grammars actually work. If we take a rule to be a statement that expresses some
generalization about the form of linguistic expressions, then no proper subpart
of a generative grammar, of any scope or size, is a rule or contains a rule.4
What I have said about phrase structure rules holds also for transformations.
Wh-movement cannot be followed or complied with. A transformation saying
“move a wh-marked phrase to the beginning of the clause” does not say that the
language has clause-initial wh-words. The language might or might not exhibit
them: there could be another transformation that moves them back again (the
device known as “reconstruction” in post-1980 transformational grammar does
exactly that whenmapping s-structures to logical form), or a transformation that
moves them to the very end of the sentence, or a rule that simply expunges them
completely (which is actually what happens in bare relatives like the one I want).
Everything depends on the rest of the grammar and how all of its components
interact.
It is very important, therefore, not to assume when we talk about people fol-
lowing particular rules, or languages having particular rules, that “rule” refers to
anything found in a generative grammar. The non-technical and informal notion
4We can see a partial exception in the case of Chomsky (1981), Lectures on Government and
Binding (lgb), but that is precisely because it is not fully generative (in the narrow sense of that
term I assume here). In lgb, modules of grammar of a completely different sort are introduced.
When the “binding theory” says that anaphors (like reflexive pronouns) must be bound in their
governing category, it actually is talking about something that has to hold within the structure
of any expression. It says that an np node with a reflexive pronoun as its lexical realization
always has a coindexed node that c-commands it in the tree (roughly, is closer to the root,
and dominated by a node that also dominates the reflexive pronoun). This use in lgb of what
linguists often call “constraints” is a departure that Chomsky made from his earlier theoretical
work. It disappeared again after 1990 with the appearance of his “minimalist program”.
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of a rule is valuable (indeed, in my view it is essential), but it simply cannot be
equated with any pieces or elements of generative grammars.
3 Normativity
What I have just said entails that we are in a certain amount of difficulty when
we come to consider the issue of whether the claims made by a grammar are (or
are not) normative. A normative statement is one that deals not with how things
are but how they ought to be, or how it is appropriate for them to be given some
set of values. Nothing in a generative grammar has that property.
Some philosophers in effect question whether normativity can arise in a phys-
ical universe. How could any physical distribution of elementary particles con-
stitute a situation in which some things (drawn from an indefinitely large range)
are objectively “good”, or “beautiful”, or “right”? Such reflections lead to moral
antirealist views under which ethical statements like “That is morally wrong” or
“You should apologize” are regarded as having more in common with grunts or
cries of pain than truth-evaluable statements like “This is made of gold”.
My own views in metaethics incline towards moral realism. But at least one
philosophically inclined linguist assumes we have to accept antirealist error the-
ories of ethics. Replying to an article in which I mentioned that I think claims
about grammaticality are normative (Pullum 2007), Geoffrey Sampson remarked:
I was at least assuming that grammatical description consists of statements
that are correct or incorrect: but correctness is not a concept applicable to
the domains of ethics or aesthetics. (As it is often put in the case of ethics,
“you cannot derive an ought from an is”.) (Sampson 2007: 112)
Sampson is assuming that claims like “Torturing children is wrong” or “Bach’s
music is beautiful” are not even truth-apt, and he thinks that my passingmention
of ethics and aesthetics has committedme to the view that claims about grammat-
icality are likewise not statements of objective fact. This is of course nothing like
what I believe. But it is instructive to read Sampson’s views (restated in Samp-
son and Babarczy 2014: 96–99), because they are a reminder of how difficult the
philosophical clarification of descriptive linguistics is going to be. While extreme
prescriptivists seem to think that a construction can be held to be grammatically
incorrect no matter how much natural usage conflicts with that claim, Sampson
represents the opposite pole, apparently holding that the only objective claims
about language concern what has occurred in a corpus, and statements about
what is grammatical or ungrammatical do not even have truth conditions.
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Let me start by attempting to be clear about what I think normativity is. Nor-
mativity is generally taken primarily as a property of statements, and then deriva-
tively as a property of domains or subject matters in which normative statements
are the appropriate mode of discourse (see Millar 2004: 93–96 for a careful dis-
cussion of how the two are related).
The claims of geology are not normative; the system of table manners is. Num-
ber theory is not a normative discipline; ethics is. Aeronautical engineering is
not normative; aesthetics is.5
Millar (2004: 92–99) points out that all the classic cases of normativity involve
normative statements providing reasons for doing, feeling, believing, desiring, or
intending something. I believe grammatical normativity falls together with the
classic cases. “It is not good table manners to lick your knife” offers a reason for
not licking your knife; “Torturing children is wrong” implies a reason for not
torturing children; “Bach’s music is beautiful” suggests a reason for planning to
attend a Bach concert; “Attributive adjectives expressing colour always follow
the noun in French” provides a reason for positioning colour adjectives after the
noun when seeking to be regarded as using normal French.
4 Prescriptivism
Touching on a rule of grammar that defines how to a speaker ought to position
French adjectives brings us inevitably to a consideration of prescriptive gram-
mars. Some discussion cannot be avoided, though in fact I will not have much
truck with prescriptivism here. I make a terminological distinction that is not
standard: althoughmany have referred to old-fashioned “don’t-do-this” grammar
and usage books as “normative grammar”, and many have said that normative
statements are prescriptive rather than descriptive, I am going to use “normative”
and “prescriptive” quite differently.
With respect to the grammatical rules for a human language (especially one
with a high-prestige standard variety), there is a crucial distinction between two
stances or attitudes:
– descriptive grammar involves the identification and statement of the rules
or constraints that define the linguistic system (rules and constraints that
I am going to argue are normative);
5Logic is a rather interesting case, since on the one hand we want to say that it is a plain and
undeniable fact that 𝑃 → 𝑄 is logically equivalent to𝑄∨¬𝑃 , but on the other hand it also seems
right and proper to reason logically rather than illogically. There is a philosophical literature
on this but, regrettably, exploring it is beyond the scope of this chapter.
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– prescriptive grammar involves the issuing of injunctions or opinions or
exhortations about what system ought to be used, or judging how well or
poorly some use of language complies with a given system.
Prescriptivist grammarians certainly see language as a normative domain, but
not in the way I am interested in.What primarily marks out prescriptivists is that
they see their role as advising or instructing or cajoling other language users to
alter their linguistic behaviour.They want to change the way we speak and write,
to lead us out of error and towards the correct path.
We can set aside here the fact that prescriptivists often have the rules wrongly
conceived or wrongly formulated. They often doggedly maintain the validity of
rules that do notmatchwhat they profess to regard as excellent usage, such as the
usage of people they explicitly admire (Orwell, Strunk, White, whoever). Often
it can be shown that they defend a rule which they unknowingly and constantly
violate in their own writing, which one might have thought was a knock-down
drag-out argument that the rule cannot be right, at least for their own English.
They never accept such arguments, preferring to insist, irrationally, that even
their own usage is to be condemned if it does not comply with the fictive rule.
And they invariably ignore grammatical differences between dialects, treating
non-standard English He don’t never come here no more as simply incorrect stan-
dard English, as if it were a poorly executed attempt at saying He does not ever
come here any more, when in truth languages or dialects that have negative con-
cord working-class and low-prestige dialects of English around the world fall
together with standard Italian, standard Polish, and other languages in which re-
peated morphological expressions of negation reinforce each other rather than
cancelling out.
But all of this is basically a side issue, because even if the prescriptivists had all
the rules exactly right, their enterprise would still be quite distinct from that of
descriptive linguistics.They are in the critical and advisory business of evaluating
language use as good or bad. I am not.
John Searle draws a relevant distinction (in his book SpeechActs, 1969) between
constitutive and regulative rules. Constitutive rules define or set up the activities
to which they apply; regulative rules are established to govern an activity that
can proceed independently of them and in defiance of them. Knocking other
marathon runners down in order to get ahead of them is still clearly running in a
marathon, because the rule thatwe should not use physical violence against other
runners in a marathon is regulative. But moving a knight six squares directly
towards the other end of the board is not playing chess: the rule that a knight
moves to a second-nearest square of opposite colour is constitutive.
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Prescriptivists take grammatical rules to be regulative. Criticizing other peo-
ple’s linguistic behaviour and attempting to get them to modify it is the goal.
That has nothing to do with my topic here, so I want to simply set the prescrip-
tive stance aside.
The question I am concerned with is whether the descriptive view of grammar
also involves a normative perspective of what the subject matter is.
What suggests normativity in the subject matter of grammar, more specifically
syntax, is the fact that there is (or at least, linguists assume there is) a distinction
betweenwell-formed and ill-formed expressions, and it holds over an indefinitely
large range, certainly far too large for it to be a matter of list membership.
What a grammar has to do is not to summarize some finite set of observations
or facts, but to use all available evidence to discover a definition, over an indef-
initely large class of candidate objects (potential expressions), of the difference
between those that are good or properly structured in the language under study
and those that are bad or improperly structured.
This does not mean that linguistics fails to be empirical (contrary to Sampson’s
assumption). Its task is to find out what the right constraints are, and that is not
an a priori matter. It can only be done empirically, ultimately by reference to the
usual behaviours and reactions of the native users of the language when distrac-
tions and irrelevant extraneous factors do not intrude.This is true despite the fact
that both intuitions and corpus attestations are fallible sources of evidence. The
epistemology is therefore subtle. I have suggested elsewhere (see Pullum 2017)
that it should be seen as based on the method of reflective equilibrium.
The way generative linguists usually view it, the grammar has to cover all the
expressions of the language, and only those expressions, and it must do it in a
way that tells us the status of novel expressions – expressions we have never
encountered before. That means making a description that is fully explicit about
how the expressions of the language – all of them, however many there may
be – are structured. And that calls for some kind of formalization of both the
representation mode and the grammatical rule system.
5 Formalization
What I mean when I refer to formalization in syntax is simply the use of mathe-
matical and logical tools to make theoretical claims more explicit. Talk about for-
malization is therefore not essentially connected to the “formalist” progamme.
It has nothing to do with de-emphasizing the semantic, pragmatic, rhetorical,
or aesthetic aspects of human languages, or with assigning more importance to
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form than to function, or with Carnap’s project of eliminating meaning from the
language of science, or with Hilbert’s doomed project of reducing all of mathe-
matics to questions of logical truth in some decidable formal logic.
The tools that formally inclined linguists have borrowed from logic for use
in framing syntactic theories over the last few decades have included rewriting
systems, automata, graphs (most importantly trees), and model theory. More re-
cently, 21st-century linguistics has been increasingly employing tools from statis-
tics and probability theory.
But there is truth in the familiar remark about how to a three-year-old with a
hammer everything looks like a nail. Syntacticians have become so completely
engrossed in working with generative grammars that they see everything in
terms of derivations, and cannot conceive of what life would be like in any other
terms.
They have paid very little attention to the fact that a generative grammar of 𝐿
says absolutely nothing about the structural properties of any non-sentence of
𝐿. They have ignored the fact that the sharp boundaries of any set defined by a
generative grammar fly in the face of the widely accepted intuitive view of ill-
formedness as gradient – the fact that one ungrammatical sentence can be more
ungrammatical than another.
They have also paid little or no attention to the fact that a generative grammar
makes syntactic properties depend crucially on the contents of a finite lexicon: a
derivation that does not terminate in a string of items belonging to the relevant
lexicon is not a derivation at all, so there is no way for a generative grammar
to represent an example like Carnap’s Pirots karulize elatically as grammatical
unless the lexicon contains a noun pirot, a verb karulize, and an adverb elatically
– which for standard English it does not.
These are not problems for formalized syntax in general. For one thing, when
we are talking about the invented languages of logic and computer program-
ming, the worries I just expressed about generative grammars turn into virtues.
For proving theorems about logical systems – completeness, consistency, com-
pactness – it is absolutely crucial that the formulæ of the logic should be sharply
defined to form a specific set with a known cardinality. And for proving correct-
ness of a computer program, the same is true. There can be no gradient levels of
ill-formedness, or potential tolerance of minor deviance, or uncertainty about the
finite list of allowable symbols, whenwe are talking about logics or programming
languages. This is the grain of truth in Michael Tomasello’s capsule summary of
“Chomskian generative grammar” (2003: 5), which he says is “a ‘formal’ theory,
meaning that it is based on the supposition that natural languages are like formal
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languages”. In a way, though I suspect not in the way he intended, he is correct.6
The sense inwhich generative grammars do treat natural languages like formal
languages has to do with the origins of their formal machinery, as already out-
lined. It was developed for a specific purposewithinmathematical logic (formaliz-
ing formation rules and inference rules in a fully general way), and it is perfectly
suited to the description of the invented languages for logic, metalogic, and com-
puter programming. But it is important that there are ways of making grammars
mathematically explicit that are quite distinct from the generative one. Chom-
sky has sometimes confusingly denied this point, claiming (as in, e.g., Chomsky
1966: 12) that for him the term “generative grammar” means nothing more than
“explicit account of sound/meaning correspondences”, but this does not square at
all with his actual usage (Ney 1993 argues this point at length). Pullum & Scholz
(2001) use the term “generative-enumerative syntax” to stress that the referent is
syntax formalized in terms of nondeterministic random enumerators; their paper
discusses certain types of explicit grammar that are not generative in this sense.
The non-generative mode of formalizing grammars that Pullum and Scholz
discuss uses model theory rather than rewriting systems to formalize syntac-
tic description. Grammatical rules are taken to be constraints on the structure
sentences, in a straightforward and informally comprehensible sense: the con-
straints in a model-theoretic grammar for English would say things that for con-
venience we can readily paraphrase in English. A few examples:
– A preposition phrase has a preposition as head.
– A lexical head is the initial subconstituent of its parent.
– A pronoun subject of a finite clause takes its nominative case form.
Such constraints can be stated more precisely as formulæ of a logic; a grammar
can be defined as a finite set of such formulæ; structures of sentences can be
taken to be the models for the interpretation of that logic; and grammaticality
can be reconstructed as satisfaction of the constraints in the grammar, in the
model-theoretic sense.
6The rest of his summary is inaccurate and confused. He says generative grammar uses “a uni-
fied set of abstract algebraic rules” (they are actually of diverse types, not at all unified); and
they “are both meaningless themselves and insensitive to the meanings of the elements they
algorithmically combine” (but algebraic operations always need interpretations, as McCawley
1968 carefully shows, and grammar rules can be written to build semantic representations si-
multaneously with syntactic ones, as in Montague 1973, Montague 1974 or Gazdar et al. 1985).
Finally he says the rules come with “a lexicon containing meaningful linguistic elements that
serve as variables in the rules” (but I see no sense in which lexical items serve as variables).
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For additional concreteness, we can look very briefly at the syntax of preposi-
tion phrases (pps) in English. A typical old-fashioned generative grammar would
include a phrase structure rule like this:
(1) pp → p np
Under its standard interpretation this licenses derivational steps in which the
symbol “pp” is replaced by the sequence “p np”, and derivatively licenses the
building of (part of) a tree diagram that looks like this:
(2) PP
P NP
We might easily think that the rule entails that prepositions always have np
complements. It does not. There could be (and in fact for English there will need
to be) other rules in the grammar saying things like this:
(3) a. pp → p pp
b. pp → p Clause
So some pps will not have np right branches. And we might easily think that
the rule at least says that those prepositions that do take np complements precede
their np complements. But it does not entail that either. There could be another
rule in the grammar saying this (where 𝜀 is a symbol representing the null string):
(4) pp → 𝜀
In that case there might be no prepositions appearing in the language at all.
Or there could be a transformational rule like this:
(5) x - p - np - y
1 - 2 - 3 - 4 ⇒ 1 - 3 + 2 - 4
In that case prepositions would always be suffixed to their NP complements –
unless some other rule in the grammar tamperedwith things further.This is what
I am referring to when I say that the grammar provides its definition holistically:
in the same way that we are told that in the Brexit negotiations nothing is agreed
until everything is agreed, with a generative grammar we do not know anything
about what any part of the grammar determines about any part of a sentence
until we know what the entire grammar yields.
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We might easily fall into the error of thinking that the rule “pp→ p np” does
say that a pp always contains a p. But it does not do that either. It does not guaran-
tee anything about the interior of pps.There could be another rule in the grammar
saying “pp→ a b c”.
Under the view I favour, the conditions on pps would be stated directly as
constraints – and for concreteness we can take them to be constraints on the
structure of trees.
Assume a predicate logic in which we quantify over nodes with variables
𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧 … and have a vocabulary of monadic predicates for category labels and
binary relations for grammatical functions. We write “B(𝑥)” to mean “node 𝑥 is
labelled with category label b” and “F(𝑥, 𝑦)” to mean “the f of node 𝑥 is node 𝑦”
(i.e., “node 𝑦 bears the grammatical function f to its parent node 𝑥”). Then the
constraint saying that pps have p heads would be expressed precisely in this way:
(6) ∀𝑥[PP(𝑥) → ∃𝑦[Head(𝑥, 𝑦) ∧ 𝑃(𝑦)]]
And if we write Lexical(𝑥) to mean “node 𝑥 bears a lexical category label”,
“Parent(𝑦, 𝑥)” to mean “𝑥 immediately dominates 𝑦”, and “𝑥 ≺ 𝑦” to mean “node
𝑥 is to the left of node 𝑦”, then the second constraint above, stating that lexical
category nodes are initial in their phrases, can be stated like this:
(7) ∀𝑥, 𝑦[Head(𝑥, 𝑦) ∧ Lexical(𝑦) → ∀𝑧[Parent(𝑧, 𝑥) → 𝑥 ≺ 𝑧]]
Any set of trees characterized by a set of first-order logic formulæ in this sort
of waywill be a regular set of trees (recognizable by a finite-state tree automaton)
and its string yield will be a context-free stringset (these results are corollaries
of theorems now found in textbooks of finite model theory like Ebbinghaus &
Flum 1999 and Libkin 2004). By giving a finite set of first-order logic statements
interpreted on tree models in this way, we explicitly characterize a set of trees
and thereby a context-free set of strings. We are in effect giving a formally ex-
plicit model for a context-free language without using a context-free generative
grammar. I argue elsewhere (Pullum 2013) that this yields significant advantages.
I point all this out merely in order to establish the point that normative prin-
ciples like those stated informally in English above can be made fully precise
and become, without change, a formalized grammar with precise consequences,
known parsability results, etc. I am in no doubt that it is worth pursuing the goal
of making the syntactic structural principles for human languages fully explicit
– formalizing them using the tools of logic and mathematics.
On the other hand, I do not believe that by formalizing some version of the
grammar rules for a language we are thereby defining a hypothesis about the
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mind – ultimately the brain structure – of an idealized native speaker of that
language. Kripke (1982) believes there are profound difficulties for this basically
Chomskyan view, because there seems to be no way to identify the unique set
of rules that guides a given speaker’s grasp of their native language: indefinitely
many grammars would account for all of the utterances they have produced (or
judged acceptable) in the past, and nothing identifiable about the speaker in ques-
tion can be said to fix the structure that will be revealed in further utterances as
the speaker goes on.
I think Scholz (1990) was right to elaborate on Kripke’s worry, and argue that
we do not obtain an explanation of 𝑆’s linguistic capabilities simply by saying
“𝑆 has a mentally inscribed representation of the generative grammar 𝐺 in his
brain”. And I think Chomsky is wrong in responding to Kripke by denying that
there is any normative aspect to grammar (see Chomsky 1986: chap. 4).
What I am suggesting is that we are better placed to see how there can be a nor-
mative conception of grammar that is not prey to Kripke’s metphysical worries if
we conceptualize grammar in model-theoretic terms, as approximate compliance
with certain structural constraints on the form of sentences.
It might also assuage the worries expressed by Riemer (Chapter 9, this volume)
concerning a kind of authoritarianism that he sees as stemming from the ideas
of generative grammar. Imagining that there is some unique generative mecha-
nism that is the mental and ultimately neurophysiological reality underlying the
capacity to use English, and teaching students about it as if it were unique, he
feels, is inimical to the idea that this complex world can be viewed from many
divergent perspectives. It might even militate against our students feeling that
they have the intellectual freedom to explore alternatives, and to encourage be-
lief in an authority that could be “argued to replicate and so to normalize, in
the domain of education, the kinds of relations of social domination on which
contemporary political orders rest” (this volume, p. 225).
The relevance of the model-theoretic approach to Riemer’s problem is that it
is by no means necessary that to adopt the “unique form hypothesis” that he
sees as implicit in standard generativism. Indeed, I see absolutely no reason to
believe that one unique, correct set of constraints defines English (or any other
language), or that there is one correct way of formally expressing the content
of such a set. What is needed for someone to be a competent user of English is
not that they have some ideal and perfect constraint set (or generative system)
neurochemically implanted in their brain, but merely that they have developed
a set of constraints on grammatical form that, to a good approximation, leads
them to structure their utterances in ways much like the way other speakers of
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English structure theirs. There will be indefinitely many ways to do this, and in-
definitely many ways to represent formally what has been done. Let a hundred
flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought contend. I regard it as emi-
nently plausible that among the vast population of native speakers of English,
millions of slightly different systems of constraints contend. The reason this is
not problematic is that all we need for linguistically expressed communication
to be possible is substantial overlap in the consequences of the different systems.
And the slight differences between the ways the constraints are defined and re-
alized will of course be the seeds of future linguistic change.
One further thing I should say about normativity concerns the notion of uni-
versal grammar. Here the issue of normativity may not be relevant at all. Modern
linguistics since Chomsky (1965) has stressed the goal of formulating a theory of
universal grammar (ug). This theory has been taken to be not just a systematiza-
tion of the facts that have been discovered to hold for all human languages, but
a kind of ideal model of the human infant’s capacity for learning languages. And
it is important that ug could in principle be an entirely non-normative domain:
it could be a description of a set of neurophysiologically instantiated devices or
of a psychological organization.
I do not regard this as plausible or well supported, because of the lack of any
account of mechanisms. How does ug constrain the growth of grammars? We
know how the curved horns of a ram grow (faster-growing cells on one side and
slower-growing on the other), but nothing at all about how ugworks or develops
in the brain. And more recent work tells us nothing that helps (the literature on
what some have been calling “biolinguistics” over the past decade seems to me
increasingly to be parodying itself).
But we can set aside the issue of whether there might be a serious theory of the
biological aspects of the human language acquisition capacity. I am concerned
here simply with understanding grammars of individual languages. This will be
necessary regardless of whether the human capacity to form and use them is
constrained by a built-in ug. It is by nomeans clear tome that any non-normative,
naturalistic, neurophysiological account of the parochial grammars of specific
languages makes sense.
It is uncontroversial that the mentally inscribed grammar that Chomsky posits
does not (i) describe all the utterances that have occurred in the past, or (ii) pre-
dict what utterances will occur in the future, or (iii) identify the probabilities of
occurrence for future utterances, or (iv) make us do whatever it is we do when
we produce an utterance or understand one. Assuming that *Fetch quickly it is
ungrammatical, for example, the correct statement of the grammatical rules of
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English does not imply (i) that no one has ever said it, or (ii) that no one will ever
say it, or (iii) that the probability of its being uttered is low, or (iv) that we ought
not to utter it.
The implication of a grammar defining something as ungrammatical is closer
to being that no one should say it if they want to be taken as speaking English
as it is usually spoken. What kind of “should” is that? Well, it should be clear
enough that we are not talking about anything closely analogous to the moral
sense of “should”. Moral philosophers standardly take morality to be universal.
Certainly for a moral realist (and moral realism is the metaethical view that I
would subscribe to), torturing a child is not immoral just for certain people in
certain circumstances though possibly moral in other cultures or under other
circumstances; it is morally wrong for everyone. Someone who disagrees is sim-
ply mistaken. Societies and cultures can evolve, and come to see that moral views
they held earlier were mistaken,
But essentially none of the rules in the grammar of a particular language can be
taken to hold universally. There are some 7,000 extant languages, differing quite
radically in grammar as well as lexicon. No one of them is more grammatically
correct in its structures than any of the others. In matters of grammar we have
to be radically relativist.
Morality also relates to behaviour in a way that has consequences for human
actions. From the fact that torturing a child is immoral it follows that we ought
not to torture a child. But from the fact that *Fetch quickly it is ungrammatical
in English nothing at all follows concerning what anyone ought to do or not do.
Whether we ought to utter it will depend entirely on the circumstances. During
a minute of silence at a funeral, we ought not to utter it, or anything else. But
if we are playing a foreign character in a play and the script has your character
saying *Fetch quickly it, then at the relevant point we ought to utter it.
This issue has sometimes been discussed in the philosophy literature, in the
context of the normativity of meaning. Philosophers of language are in fact mad-
deningly uniform in their habit of talking only about reference of words – as if
all we ever do with our language were pronounce the word “cat” and success-
fully achieve reference thereby to a creature of the species Felis silvestris catus,
and as if that were the deepest and most interesting thing about language. But
even there, saying that cat refers to a certain animal species in the Felidae family
does not mean that we ought to describe cats by using that word. Even if we
do want to refer to the creatures, we might want to use moggy or pussy or foul
razor-clawed mewing beast from hell. And we have no obligation to talk about
cats or refer to them at all if we do not choose to.
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My concern here is not with elementary lexical meaning but with syntax. How-
ever, it just as clear that no syntactic rule or constraint or principle conveys any
obligation or presumption about how we should act.
For one thing, the constraints of syntax mostly involve categories and restric-
tions and classifications of which we have no conscious knowledge whatsoever,
so typically we could never know whether we had violated them or not. And
almost everyone agrees that “ought” implies “can”, of course: it is generally not
taken as coherent to assert that we have a duty to do something that we are
totally incapable of doing.
This point offers a clue to some understanding of what the prescriptivists are
up to. They peddle rules that, while not a correct reflection of the actual syn-
tax of the language, are fairly easy for even linguistically unsophisticated people
to check: never place an adverb between infinitival to and a plain-form verb (to
boldly go), never end a sentence with a preposition (What are you looking at?),
never begin a sentence with however, avoid the passive, etc. Such rules are hope-
less as a guide to how to actually use the language like a normal person, but
they have become cultural markers of attention to grammar. Most people are
not aware of how inaccurate they are or how much they are ignored by truly
accomplished writers, and it is moderately easy to identify violations.
Prescriptivists fail in some of their identifications: they mistake particles for
prepositions, and mistake existentials or predicative adjective constructions for
passives, and so on; but they think they are correctly applying genuine rules,
and they see a kind of quasi-moral force to the rules: they see the people who do
not respect the rules as falling short of the standards of behaviour that society
ought to maintain and enforce. In other words, they see the rules of grammar as
regulative.
Domains involving obligations on agents to act (or not act) in certain ways are
not the only domain for normativity. Neither constitutive nor regulative rules of
a game have any connection to anything about obligations. We are not obliged to
play the game at all, for one thing, so the rule defining a knight’s move certainly
does not say we should or should not move any particular knight.
Moreover, making an illegal move is not something we “shouldn’t do” in abso-
lute terms; whether we should do it depends on the circumstances. We might be
playing against a sadistic jailer, with the life of a fellow prisoner forfeited if we
lose, in which case we should make the illegal move if we can get away with it
and it will ensure a win.
What we should do, if “should” has anything like the sense it has in connection
with morality or similar kinds of obligation, has nothing whatever to do with the
normative force of linguistic rules.
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I should also note that the rules of syntax do not have normative force in any
instrumental way: it is not that they should be obeyed because bad things will
happen if they are not obeyed, or because following them will enable one to get
things that one needs.There is sometimes hint of this in naive talk about language
and how we learn it: people talk about needing to make oneself understood in
order to interact satisfactorily with other people. But in fact there is very little
pressure to get things right grammatically. There are people who live most of
their lives speaking mostly in a language that is not their native language, and
speaking it very badly. They still find ways to get what they want.
And perhaps the starkest andmost obvious refutation of the instrumental view
comes from looking at the actual facts of human infants’ experience: while they
are incapable of speech they are constantly looked after, and all their needs are
met, but once they are four or five and can speak and understand they start being
expected to do things that other people want them to do. The idea that we speak
the way we do because we have to on instrumental grounds is nonsense.
6 Understanding
The normative rules of games and linguistic systems do not define anything as
unethical, or contemptible, or inadvisable, or evil. But I think what they do can be
elucidated in terms of the very interesting work of Alan Millar in Understanding
People (2004), cited above. Millar stresses the notion of a commitment to follow
rules: he separates the following of rules from the commitment to follow them.
It is important that there can be tacitly acknowledged rules that no one has
set down in detail. Management of phone calls is an example. Nowhere is it set
down that when a call is connected the recipient of the call is supposed to speak
first, or that normally the maker of the call is supposed to instigate the ending of
the call, or that the recipient speaks last (echoing the goodbye of the maker of the
call). The fact that a certain set of rules is tacit does not preclude the existence of
a practice based on them.
This is the potential answer to the problem with Crispin Wright’s observation
about effortless first-person authority: we do not appear to have that for syn-
tax, in the general case. We can have tacit command of a rule that one cannot
state, and the fact that we cannot state it does not mean we cannot recognize
departures from what it requires.
What the tacitly acknowledged rules of grammar do is to define certain ways
of structuring expressions and associating themwith meanings. Millar put it this
way in the handout for a talk at the University of Edinburgh in 2010:
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The commitments incurred by participation in a practice have a closely anal-
ogous structure to those incurred by beliefs and intentions. Participating in
a practice, G, incurs a commitment to following the rules of G. To a first
approximation that amounts to it being the case that one ought to avoid
continuing to participate in G while not following the rules of G. [… T]here
are twoways to discharge the commitment – bywithdrawing from the prac-
tice and by complying with the rules.
Rules of grammar that define expressions as being structured in certain ways
do not entail that we ought to structure our expressions in those ways.
We do incur a commitment to structure our expressions in the English way
when we decide to speak English. But incurring a commitment to do something
does not entail that we ought to do it. Sometimes the way to deal with a commit-
ment that we incur by engaging in a certain practice is to cease engaging in the
practice.
Millar uses the example of offensive ethnic terms to illustrate the point that
the existence of a practice says nothing about what we ought to do: Chink in
English is an offensive epithet meaning “Chinese person”. But the existence of a
practice of saying Chink to mean “Chinese person” does not imply that anyone
ought to use the term: most would say the opposite is true.
It is not by anymeans as easy to illustrate the same sort of thing in syntax, but I
think it is possible. Consider the fact that it is usual for the direct object to follow
the verb in what the Cambridge Grammar of the English Language (Huddleston
& Pullum 2002) calls canonical clauses:
(8) a. The old tree shades the house.
b. * The old tree the house shades.
That rule codifies a certain practice, applying the generalization to an indefi-
nitely large range of expressions, not just recording properties of previous utter-
ances. It has normative force in that it defines it as syntactically incorrect to put
the object before the verb. If we do not put the object before the verb, other things
being equal, we are not respecting the constraints of English syntax. But it does
not follow that anyone ought to place any direct object before any verb. A person
might have reason not to respect the constraints of English syntax. For example,
someone might be imitating the poetry of the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries,
where the long-extinct order with object before verb was often employed.
One might well ask what point there could be to having rules that do not have
to be obeyed. This would be like having rules of the road that nobody has to
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follow. The rules of the road at least have instrumental motivation relating to
safety, but in the case of grammar we do not even have that. Millar (handout) in
effect answers that question when he says:
On the view I am promoting it is our participation in practices and our abil-
ity to recognize what these require in particular situations that enables us
both to make reasonable predictions about, and make sense of, what people
think and do. The basic idea is simple. Because we know how people are
supposed to act we can often make sense of how they do act and how they
are likely to act.
In talking about making sense Millar is not necessarily to be interpreted as refer-
ring to the understanding of meaning, either semantic or pragmatic. The point
has nothing inherently to do with the correct apprehension of literal meaning
or perceiving the utterer’s intended meaning, though it may apply to those ac-
complishments, and it may not even imply those abilities. I am breaking with the
usual practice among philosophers of language in wanting to talk about syntax.
The understanding I am alluding to is simply a matter of making sense of what
is going on linguistically: what sort of system the interlocutor is using, what to
expect, what to infer about the intent of a speaker or the likely form of further
utterances.
Understanding of meaning is neither necessary nor sufficient for the syntac-
tic ability I am talking about. It is not necessary because it is often possible to
grasp the structure of an uttered sentence without having the vaguest clue as
to its meaning. Faced with something like I doubt whether that is not necessarily
not untrue, most people are aware that they have heard something grammatical
but they cannot work out the truth conditions of a quadruple negation. And we
can immediately perceive the grammaticality of Appearances are not deceptive, it
only seems as if they are; working out from its meaning whether it is sensible or
contradictory is much harder. But it is also not sufficient: being able to extract
the meaning does not imply grasping the syntactic structure. We often correctly
identify intended meanings despite massive non-compliance with syntax: if a
worried stranger says “Me need you help! Me house go fire!” we would know what
was meant.
However, it remains true that if we follow the practice of ordering words and
structuring phrases and clauses in the English manner, and our interlocutor un-
derstands us to be following that practice, they can make sense of certain aspects
of our intentions that otherwise would be inscrutable to them, and they canmake
much better guesses at why our linguistic behaviour is the way it is, and what to
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expect in future utterances. They can assume that if we begin an utterance with
an auxiliary verb and continue with a nominative pronoun (Can we…; Is he…;
Will they…) we are beginning a closed interrogative, and thus that we will prob-
ably continue with a verb phrase, and are probably about to ask a question with
a yes/no answer, and are likely to have made the assumption that they know the
answer to the question, and so on.
If we depart from the usual practices, that does not necessarily mean that we
should not have, or that we have made a mistake. If our interlocutor detects
that we have departed from the usual grammatical practices, they can simply
regard us as having ceased to operate in accord with the usual rules, and they
can reason about why that might be and what they should assume from now on.
A normal context is one where we appear to be respecting the same constraints
on sentence structure as they would, and using words they have encountered
before, so they assume we are using the same language, and they turn out to
be right. But there are also anomalous contexts, such as one in which a native
speaker who is required to draft a forced confession by the agents of a foreign
dictatorship puts subtle syntactic mistakes into the text to signal that he is under
duress, intending people back home to spot that he is not complying with the
usual constraints.
There are any number of reasons why we might depart from normal syntax:
we might be half asleep, drunk, delirious, brain-damaged, interrupted, distracted,
foreign, playful, joking, impersonating someone. But if our interlocutor can see
why we have departed from the usual grammatical practices, they may be able
to understand what is going on with us. Otherwise, we become mysterious. But
it is of course our right to be mysterious if we want to: the fact that grammatical
constraints have normative force does not impose on us, even as a default, any
obligation to obey.
7 Conclusion
What I have tried to do in this rather wide-ranging survey is to make the follow-
ing points. I have stressed that the formalist movement in logic had an important
rationale: representing logical proof in a totally syntactic way so that the com-
pleteness and consistency of a logical language (the correspondence between its
resources for proof and its efficacy in preserving truth under inference) could
be mathematically verified. It was in pursuit of this goal that Emil Post invented
the systems we now call generative grammars, the systems that were repurposed
three decades later for use in linguistics.
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Though talk of “rules of grammar” persisted in linguistics, even in Chomsky’s
work, it did not really make sense within a generative perspective (as Chomsky
himself noticed): rewriting operations are not rules in the sense that we can fol-
low them, behave in accordance with them, be guided by them, or violate them.
Yet we do need a conception of rules with normative force in the ordinary sense
of rules that can be respected or violated, for the point of linguistic grammars
is not to compactly represent a corpus or to characterize a mental organ, but to
define well-formedness over an indefinitely large class of sentences.
The claim that rules of grammar have normative force should not be confused
with the bid to change people’s linguistic habits and practices represented by the
prescriptive grammar tradition. And it should also not be taken to be at odds with
the empirical character of linguistics (there is a fact of the matter about whether
English is a prepositional or a postpositional language), or to be in conflict with
the goal of making the predictions of grammars fully clear and explicit, with help
from tools from logic and mathematics.
I believe that generative grammars (the systems that Post invented) were the
wrong tool to pick, but there are alternatives. Repurposing model theory for syn-
tactic description, for example, is a better idea. Under that view grammars are
finite sets of constraints on structure, andwell-formedness is construed as model-
theoretic satisfaction. An early work advocating this view was Johnson & Postal
(1980). Rogers (1998) develops it in a much more technically sophisticated way,
and uses the model-theoretic perspective to derive some fascinating insights con-
cerning what generative grammars of early 1980s vintage actually claimed (they
were in fact strongly equivalent to context-free phrase structure grammars). A
small but growing minority of syntacticians have been further developing the
idea that formal grammars could be developed along model-theoretic lines (see
Pullum & Scholz 2001 and Pullum 2013 for discussion and references).
As to how formalized constraints on sentence structure can have normative
force without in any sense implying anything about what anyone should do, or
implying any judgment on a person that they have done something wrong (or
right), I think thework to turn to is that ofMillar (2004), who (as briefly recounted
above) relates the normativity of rules in certain kinds of systems not in what
we ought to do but in what can make our words or actions more predictable to
others. Weaving together the strands I have briefly surveyed here offers what I
believe might be a productive line of work in the steadily unifying disciplines of
philosophy, psychology, and linguistic science.
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